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p. 917. Self-determination and the willlocked

  • Thomas Pink

Abstract

‘Self-determination and the will’ assesses the exercise problem. Hobbes' theory of action cites the causal power of desires as the capability for action. This threatens libertarian freedom, but how can freedom be threatened by the nature of action? Is there another way of understanding action without cause? In real life, decisions can be made without any underlying desires. The practical reason-based model of action differentiates decisions (actions with a goal) from desires, and makes action a mode of exercising reason, rather than a resultant effect. Thus, action and goal direction no longer contradict libertarian freedom.

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